

Introduction

New Directions in Political Sociology

Thomas Janoski, Cedric de Leon, Joya Misra, and Isaac William Martin

In 2029, the US is engaged in a bloodless world war that will wipe out the savings of millions of American families. Overnight, on the international currency exchange, the “almighty dollar” plummets in value, to be replaced by the new global currency, the *bancor*. In retaliation, the President declares that America will default on its loans. The government prints money to cover its bills. What little real currency remains for savers is rapidly eaten away by runaway inflation.

The Mandibles, A Family, 2026–2047, Lionel Shriver, 2016

Writing in 2016, Lionel Shriver described a future in which the decline of the American Empire would come at the hands of a global economic catastrophe. Her fictional account is not far from some social scientific predictions. More than a few scholars have projected that the United States will lose its hegemonic position by 2025 (IMF 2016) or 2034 (Mann 2012b) leaving a tri-polar world of the United States, the European Union, and China sharing 50 to 60 percent of world GDP (IMF 2018: 14; Erin and Chase-Dunn, this volume).¹ On the military front, US defense expenditures adjusted for inflation may decrease over the next three decades, while China’s will surely continue to grow (Mann 2012b). The world faces multiple related crises. Economic inequality is increasing rapidly within many societies. The global climate is warming and bringing more extreme weather events. Floods of refugees are fleeing failed states and civil wars. Since the last edition of this handbook, the wave of revolutions known as the Arab Spring has come and gone, formerly democratic European governments have

¹ These percentages are based on GDP in 2017 with the United States having 24.25 percent of world GDP, China having 15 percent, and Western Europe 20.4 percent. These percentages will change for the countries over time as China’s rate of growth is 6.3–6.9 percent a year, the United States’ is 2.6–2.7 percent, and Europe’s 2.0–2.8 percent (IMF 2018; OECD 2018). However, the total of the three countries will stay in this range for the next decade or so. However, Hung (2017) sees reason to expect lower growth rates for China in the future.

fallen prey to antidemocratic regimes (e.g., Hungary and Poland), and powerful state and nonstate actors have actively sought to sabotage democratic elections around the world.

How will political sociology help us discern and analyze such changes now and in the next few decades? The future of politics is as uncertain as ever, but a brief overview of the history of political sociology may offer some clues to the theoretical challenges and opportunities ahead. For convenience, we divide the recent history of political sociology into three periods, suggesting that the field is now entering a fourth period with an expanding focus.

In the first period, from the 1950s to mid-1970s, mainstream political sociology was preoccupied with social class in the context of the Cold War. Political sociologists focused on the struggles of social groups – mostly classes, followed to a lesser extent by gender, racial, and ethnic groups – to influence the institutions of government through political parties, lobbies, voluntary associations, and social movements. In *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (1963, 1981), arguably the canonical work of this era, Seymour Martin Lipset viewed political sociology as addressing the social struggle to win elections – what he called “the democratic class struggle.”² What made sociology distinctive from political science, he held, was its attention to the “social bases” of politics, especially social classes (e.g., de Leon 2014).

Some scholars in this period, such as Floyd Hunter (1953) and C. Wright Mills (1959), sought to document the common class positions and overlapping social group memberships of elite decision-makers in the public and private sectors. Other scholars used survey methods to describe the complex processes by which status and class affected mass opinion. For example, Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, in *Personal Influence* (1955) showed how opinion leaders propagated opinion in small groups, such as families and unions, that were largely segregated by class (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1986 [1954]). By the 1960s, the sociological approach to voting and public opinion was supplanted by the more individualistic Michigan School, which emphasized party identification as the prime mover of political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960).

In the second period, many political sociologists shifted their attention from studies of the sources of political behavior to studies of the transformations of states and other political structures. A particularly influential early work in this vein was Barrington Moore’s magisterial *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966), which transformed Lipset’s question about the social class bases of democratic behavior into a historical question about the social class struggles that first led to the creation of democratic regimes. From the 1970s to

² Despite Lipset’s sexist title, women played a critical role in this era. For instance, in survey research studies the interviewers and interviewees were most often women, which was acknowledged not so much by Lipset but by Katz and Lazarsfeld in *Personal Influence* (1955; Douglas 2006).

the mid-1990s, political sociologists influenced by Moore's approach turned their attention to explaining other kinds of revolutions and transformations of the state.³ Some sought to explain the socialist and anticolonial revolutions of the mid-twentieth century with reference to relations of production and class power (e.g., Paige 1978). Others aimed to explain the emergence of welfare states in advanced industrial economies.

Gøsta Esping-Andersen's *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990) set an influential agenda for work in this vein by identifying three welfare regime types – liberal, conservative, and social democratic – associated with different patterns of allocating social rights. Whereas some scholars influenced by Moore retained his emphasis on class struggle, other political sociologists, influenced by the Weberian tradition, began to emphasize the independent contribution of state organizations themselves to the outcome of political processes. Theda Skocpol (1979) famously explained differences among revolutions as the result of variation in the state's interactions with local and international actors. This was followed by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol's comprehensive approach to the state in *Bringing the State Back In* (1985). Postcolonial, gendered and racial perspectives, influenced by earlier works of postcolonial theory (e.g., Fanon 1961), also became more influential in political sociology during this period (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Blauner 1972; Boserup 1970; Frank 1967; Wilson 1977; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998). Methodological innovation in political sociology in this period emphasized methods for comparison over large sweeps of time and space, including large-scale historical analyses, qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin 1987), and cross-sectional and time series regression modeling.

The third period, which we may date roughly from the 1990s to about 2010, coincided with a tumultuous period in world history, including the fall of communism, the neoliberalization of China, and the spread of formally democratic institutions around the world. Some political sociologists reconfigured class models to address these new realities. Others turned to cultural models of politics to explain enduring continuities in the face of these sweeping changes. Rogers Brubaker's *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992), to take one influential example, traced differences in French and German citizenship policy to long-standing differences in understandings of national belonging. This was also the period in which feminist political sociology came into its own, building on earlier work by Ester Boserup (1970) and Elizabeth Wilson (1977). Ann Orloff (1993) and Ruth Lister (2003 [1998]), for example, criticized Esping-Andersen for ignoring the ways in which different welfare regimes commodify and decommodify men and women differently (Orloff 1993: 303).

³ One major exception is Craig Reinerman's *American States of Mind* (1987), an excellent qualitative study of why some private delivery workers and public welfare employees voted for Ronald Reagan.

A particularly important synthesis was arguably Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Orloff's edited volume, *Remaking Modernity* (2005), which held that comparative historical sociology had shifted from social structural to cultural explanations. There were many influences in this cultural turn. The French influence was particularly palpable, with scholars drawing increasingly on such theorists as Foucault and Bourdieu. In addition, some scholars embraced a neo-Gramscian cultural approach. Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau's collaboration drew on Gramsci's theoretical works to move beyond the Marxist preoccupation with class and to center the discursive dynamics of politics in an agonistic democracy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Mouffe 2013). Discourse analysis challenged the dominance of comparative and quantitative methods. Research on the public sphere shifted to identity processes, social movements, and global power structures (see Kate Nash 2010 for a good overview). Scholars influenced by Foucault began to place increasing emphasis on surveillance and governmentality.

In each period, the domain of political sociology expanded to encompass a broader range of political phenomena. The first *Handbook of Political Sociology* was written in the early 2000s, toward the end of this third period. Twenty years later, political sociology is on the cusp of a fourth period, in which political sociology is expanding yet again. Before addressing this new period in the conclusion, we pause to examine the definition of political sociology that will both encompass our precursors and speak to the cutting edge.

WHAT IS POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY?

In *What Is Political Sociology?* Elisabeth Clemens defines the purpose of the subfield as the explanation of "the emergence, reproduction, and transformation of different forms of political ordering" (2016: 7–15). Implicit within Clemens' synthetic view are two competing approaches to political sociology. Lewis Coser in *Political Sociology* expressed the first, institutional definition of political sociology as

[the] branch of sociology which is concerned with the social causes and consequences of given power distributions within or between societies, and with the social and political conflicts that lead to changes in the allocation of power. *All study of political processes focuses attention on the state.* (1966: 1, emphasis added)

This focus on the state, understood as an institutional form, finds its way into much of political sociology (e.g., for a recent statement see Dobratz, Waldner, and Buzzell 2016 [2012]: 5). In Coser's account, the connection to the state, defined in institutional terms, is the core of what is considered "political."

The second view follows Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, and other analysts who saw all of society as suffused with power relations. In contrast to Weber, who defined the state as a particular organization that monopolized the legitimate means of coercion, Gramsci (2011) expanded the definition of the

state, and with it the social scientific study of politics, to encompass *all* relations of class domination within society, even those that take place outside of governmental institutions, and even if they do not appear coercive on their face. As he wrote in his *Prison Notebooks*:

If political science means the science of the State, and the State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules, then it is obvious that all the essential questions of sociology are nothing other than the questions of political science. (2011: 504)

Later theorists relaxed Gramsci's focus on class, and began to see all social relations as potentially implicated in relations of domination – and, therefore, as belonging to the proper domain of political sociology. As Claire Blencowe suggests, in a recent chapter on Foucault and political sociology, that “madness, psychiatric care and the ‘psy-disciplines,’ the human and the human sciences, criminality and its treatment, sexuality, public health, race and eugenics, liberal governance, ethics and political philosophy” are all proper objects of political sociology, because all of these domains involve relations of power (2017; Foucault 1980; Hindess 1996: 98–113). This broad definition of the domain of political sociology implicitly argues against fetishizing “the state” (Mitchell 1991) as a particular institution or set of institutions, and instead identifies relations of power anywhere that knowledge (and presumably suppressed knowledge) exists.

The strength of the first definition is that it focuses on what people generally consider to be politics: namely, those institutions of government that we commonly call “political.” This definition may be critiqued for its neglect of what Gramsci might call hegemonic power. The strength of the second definition is that it can focus on hegemonic relations wherever they occur. It may be critiqued in its turn for losing sight of what is most particular to state institutions, namely, their relationship to institutionalized coercion and violence.

In most contemporary research called “political sociology,” and in this *New Handbook*, there is some direct or indirect focus on the state and the concomitant attempts to maintain, change, or resist it. Jeff Manza (2011), for example, defines political sociology as “the study of power and the relationship between societies, states, and political conflict. It is a broad subfield that straddles political science and sociology, with ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ components.” The macro-focus here refers to “nation-states, political institutions and their development, and the sources of social and political change (especially those involving large-scale social movements and other forms of collective action).” The micro-focus “examines how social identities and groups influence individual political behavior, such as voting, attitudes, and political participation.” Though they differ in emphasis, many influential

attempts to define political sociology today would focus on the connection between the state and civil society.⁴

At the same time, most contemporary political sociology – and many of the authors of this volume – bridge these traditions by emphasizing that the “state” comprises heterogeneous, permeable, and sometimes partly incoherent congeries of organizations and arrangements rather than a single organization. The state has many faces or “many hands” (Morgan and Orloff 2017). It may take contradictory stances, as when state development agencies fund micro-enterprise at the same time that state security services sweep vendors off the streets (Karides 2005). Its precise contours are often unclear and constructed interactively. The boundaries between state and civil society are increasingly blurred.

The same may be said of the boundary between political sociology and political science. There is no hard and fast dividing line, and many scholars belong to both disciplines. To be sure, political sociologists and political scientists may exhibit some differences in their typical practice.⁵ A significant portion of research in political science, for example, tends to be anchored in individualistic traditions, whether psychological or rational choice perspectives, while political sociology more commonly focuses on the social bases of politics in groups, organizations with formal boundaries, and informal institutions.⁶ Nevertheless, a large subset of political science overlaps with political sociology and vice versa. For our purposes, trying to erect a clear boundary between sociology and political science is less useful than delineating the contours of the current movement in political sociology. Though this is easier to do in hindsight than in real time, it is evident, as we look forward from this moment, that there are major theoretical and substantive changes afoot.

We group contemporary political sociology into six topic areas that correspond to the sections of this handbook. Within each, we identify new directions. First, in the domain of theory, political sociologists have made increasing use of Bourdieu’s field theory, and along with it a definite reemphasis on the power of class. We also find increasing theoretical

⁴ Cultural politics as formulated by Kate Nash (2010, 2017) takes this a step further and finds that cultural hegemonies determine power and that behavioral politics is superfluous; hence, there is almost no need for the subfield of political sociology. Often this approach is highly theoretical or polemic, and avoids empirical studies.

⁵ The 1960s differentiation of the two disciplines focused on how sociology looked at the influence of society on politics, while political science examined the impact of politics on society. The state-centric approach in sociology negates this distinction. Another view saw political science looking more directly at the state than political sociology. However, in practice political sociology and political science do both.

⁶ Textbooks and introductions to political sociology include: Clemens 2016; Dobratz et al. 2012; Domhoff 2013; Glasberg and Shannon 2011; Nash 2010; Neuman 2004; Orum and Dale 2008; and Faulks 2000.

emphasis on culture, empire, gender, and race and ethnicity. Second, theories of political sociology have become more alert to the politics of knowledge production, and the study of the politics of knowledge has exploded. We devote a whole section to the political sociology of knowledge, information, and expertise. Third, political sociology retains its focus on the state, but approaches to the state increasingly focus on disaggregating states. We review several recent bodies of literature on types of states and their transformations in Part III. Fourth, scholarship on civil society has taken a turn toward the study of global and transnational processes. Recent scholarship has renewed an older literature on political parties and populism, but has also drawn attention to fluid forms of civic and political engagement that are not always well bounded within national states. Fifth, political sociologists have continued to investigate the politics of particular policy domains, with especially active literatures on the political sociology of economic policy, migration, sexuality and gender, environment, and terrorism and securitization. Sixth, studies of globalization have continued, but have become more focused on race, populism, financialization, trade, and transnational movements. We review these sections in turn.

PART I: THEORIES OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Theories of political sociology have undergone considerable change. In the first section of this handbook, a comprehensive set of theoretical chapters show the complexity and new directions that theory in political sociology has taken. Prominent among these statements are Pierre Bourdieu's theory of fields that is taken up by a number of chapters but especially so in three of them. Some chapters see a convergence of cultural and political economy approaches, while the chapters on race and gender have theoretical bases quite distinct from the other chapters but commonality with postcoloniality. The last chapter in this section provides us with a vision of where political sociology may be going in the next decade. These sometimes controversial statements about theory reflect the changes in it since the turn of the century, and also challenge us with the new directions that political sociology may take in the future.

In Chapter 1, Cedric de Leon and Andy Clarno address changes in conceptions of power, with particular attention to the influence of Foucault and Bourdieu. These thinkers drew attention to the pervasiveness of hegemonic or "soft" forms of power based on consent. However, de Leon and Clarno argue that theories of race recently have begun to renew our attention on the interdependence of hegemonic power with violence and domination in political life. Many of these new developments are influenced by postcolonial theory, which evolved in the context of countries subjected to empire in the past and present. De Leon and Clarno emphasize the contribution that studies of settler colonialism and racial domination can make to the sociology of power more

generally. In this way, postcolonial theories involving gender and race present major challenges for the next generation of political sociologists.

In Chapter 2 on class, elite, and conflict theories, Harland Prechel and Linzi Berkowitz defend the theoretical importance of class in the field of politics. Their focus is on the upper-class elites who, they argue, control the lower and middle classes quite effectively through financialization and neoliberalism. Capitalist class fractions mobilized through social networks in both the political and global economic arenas in the late twentieth century to overcome constraints on their power. Prechel and Berkowitz's review focuses on the social networks of corporate and political leaders who sought to deregulate markets, and, they argue, created a hegemonic culture that is in firm control of working- and lower-class citizens. The result is increasing inequality within nation-states in the Western world, and a set of policies that keep developing countries subordinated. In effect, they argue, upper-class domination through processes of political economy persists in most nation-states.

In Chapter 3, Caleb Scoville and Neil Fligstein review field theory in political sociology. They use a spatial and relational approach to understanding how political actors negotiate, coalesce, or conflict with each other in a field of power. Actors "jockey" for position with shared and disputed meanings, rules, norms, and interpretive frames that guide their relationships. Scoville and Fligstein review several field theoretic approaches, including Bourdieu's theory, institutional theory, and Fligstein and McAdam's theory of strategic action fields. The latter, they argue, has the most to teach us about the emergence and transformation of field dynamics. While some change may come from internal field dynamics, the more common forces for change come from invading groups, large-scale macro-events, and interfield linkages; and these changes are often nested. Stable or settled fields are easier to examine but still challenging. They then apply field theory to environmental change and governance in Germany, China, and globally through international institutions.

In Chapter 4, Mabel Berezin, Emily Sandusky, and Thomas Davidson examine recent developments in the cultural sociology of politics. The cultural turn in political sociology is now several decades old, and Berezin, Sandusky, and Davidson argue that culture now merits a central place in any treatment of core questions in political sociology. The nation-state, they argue, is defined in terms of a putative national culture, and the attribution of meaning to the nation is central to ordinary political life. They also identify cultural processes implicit in sociological accounts of political participation – including studies of voting, civic associationalism, political discourse, and social movements. Finally, they argue for a turn toward cultural processes that transcend the boundaries of nation-states. Religion, understood as a set of discourses and practices, has tremendous political salience – and yet the most contentious political questions about religion in our time clearly concern transnational religious affiliations and cultural movements.

In Chapter 5, Julian Go discusses postcolonial theorizing as a multiplicity of perspectives rather than as a causal explanation. He emphasizes the importance of recognizing that knowledge, culture, and politics are all shaped by a history of global hierarchy and power. Moreover, throughout most of modern history, empire and colonialism matter for almost all phenomena of interest to present-day political sociology (i.e., immigration, terrorism, populism, etc.). Examining political sociology through a postcolonial lens allows scholars to identify biased assumptions and metrocentric theories that lead to misrecognition of the nature of politics both in the non-West or Global South, and in the Global North. Go presents postcolonial theory as an important lens for any working sociologist who wishes to study political processes on a transnational or global scale. Postcolonial relationalism would transform how we look at a wide variety of political issues.

In Chapter 6, Jeff Hearn and Barbara Hobson discuss the challenges of feminist theorizing in political sociology, with a particular focus on citizenship and intersectionality. Feminist theorizing attends to how gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship, and other statuses intersect to shape politics. Starting with T. H. Marshall, Hearn and Hobson consider how varied approaches to analyzing “citizenships” give political sociologists a deeper understanding of the differing relationships between society and the state. Hearn and Hobson widen understanding of participatory citizenship, to include a broader range of practices than are usually considered political. They also explore how discourses of difference, equality, and pluralism have framed debates about women’s citizenship claims. The chapter explores the varied terrain of feminist political theorizing around men and masculinities; postcolonial, decolonial, and critical race theories; migration; and transnational processes and actors. They close the chapter with a discussion of current challenges regarding nationalism, the undermining of gender/sexual citizenship, global and marketized citizenship, and growing inequalities.

In Chapter 7, Joe Feagin and Sean Elias consider the persistence of racial and ethnic discrimination and violence in the United States. The authors argue that the USA is a systematically racist state, by which they mean that the state plays a substantial role in reinforcing and even creating racism. While the hyperracist Jim Crow state ended in the mid-1970s, they argue, the modern racist state has maintained elements of institutionalized racism. Feagin and Elias argue that apparent advances in racial equality are subject to a “time-limitation principle”: such advances predictably produce a white backlash that restores American society to its default or equilibrium condition of racist oppression. Feagin and Elias argue that postracial optimism and the small effects of ameliorative policies pale in comparison to the continuous backlash tendencies of the dominant white order. It is most illuminating to conceptualize the United States as a constitutively racist state.

In Chapter 8, Thomas Janoski argues that the era of division between cultural and structural approaches to political sociology is over. Although this

division long marked the field – with “cultural” theories emphasizing the power of meanings, ideas, and symbols, while “structural” theories emphasized the power of coercion and economic incentives – political sociologists today are more likely to find culture *in* structure and vice versa. As evidence for this convergence, Janoski presents a side-by-side reading of Michael Mann’s four-volume *The Sources of Social Power* and a selection of late-career works by Pierre Bourdieu, including his lectures collected in the volume *On the State*. Despite their different starting points, these theorists converge on multicausal theories that recognize the independent influence of economic, military, cultural, and political power – and that treat the interplay of these types of power as a central problem for political sociology. Janoski concludes that even where Bourdieu and Mann differ, their macro-political theories point the way toward a promising synthetic approach to the field.

Finally, John Levi Martin and Nick Judd in Chapter 9 argue that the future of theory in political sociology is likely to require us to abandon an old-fashioned theory of action inherited from Talcott Parsons. They argue that it is no longer plausible to regard human action as the result of people deliberately applying means–ends reasoning to work out the course of action that will best reach their goals (or that will best comply with their normative commitments). Cognition relies on heuristics and is deeply imbricated with the social environment. For this reason, Martin and Judd argue that a key problem for political sociology is understanding the relationship between contexts or fields in which actors are embedded. A legislator acts in relation to her colleagues in the legislature, for example, but also in relation to a broader field – replete with interest groups, voting publics, and parties in the electorate. Political sociology needs a theory that addresses these dynamic relationships.

PART II: MEDIA EXPLOSION, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, AND DEMOGRAPHIC REVERSALS

Political sociologists have focused increasingly on the politics of knowledge, broadly construed to include the production and circulation of information about the world. Although Karl Mannheim’s *Ideology and Utopia* (1936) was a founding document of political sociology and the sociology of knowledge, the two fields developed apart in the second half of the twentieth century. Their convergence today may result, in part, from renewed interest in transformations in the world of political communication – and in particular from the political salience of the Internet and communication technologies in our time. It also may result from the perceived politicization of claims to science and expertise. Moreover, the politically motivated contestation of journalistic expertise – associated with the slur “fake news” – raises afresh some very old questions about the place of information in political life. Nevertheless, the new cacophony of media from websites to expanding

television networks spouting political messages on an hourly basis is something new that is in the face of many citizens.

Michael Schudson and Gal Beckerman's Chapter 10 on new and hybrid media examines changes that have come about in political participation through the media. While the Internet has lowered transaction costs for transmitting information, there is no evidence that it has produced an abrupt break in patterns of civic engagement. Most people now as before get their news about the world from a variety of sources. There is little evidence that the Internet has increased our tendency to isolate ourselves in ideological echo chambers. New media have hybridized with older forms of communication and engagement – citizens use Twitter to mobilize each other for demonstrations; legacy news magazines stream video on Facebook; organizations use email to reach members they may already have contacted via other means. Schudson and Beckerman argue that the attempt to isolate effects of a single new communication technology is a blind alley for political sociology, and that we need more research on how – and with what effect – organizations use these hybrid media practices.

In Chapter 11, Rebecca Jean Emigh, Dylan Riley, and Patricia Ahmed review advances in the sociology of information gathering. They review recent scholarship showing how the construction of official statistics may be influenced by social and historical conditions, and make four points: information is not neutral; it transforms reality; it is socially interactive; and it directly connects to technologies of power. They also present a new synthesis of Bourdieusian, Weberian, and Foucauldian positions on the power of official statistics. Official statistics can discipline society, but social groups and citizens can influence the construction of official information. Emigh, Riley, and Ahmed show how power has been exerted through four mechanisms: legibility of data and messages; centralization of data collection and judgment; classification and normalization of categories; and institutionalization of data collection and dissemination. They argue that political sociologists have considerably more work to do to document the conditions under which these mechanisms operate and the effects that they have.

J. Craig Jenkins shows in Chapter 12 how the advent of Big Data is having important effects on politics. States now have access to large volumes of privately produced data on people that go beyond the census and administrative data that existed previously. On one hand, the new data may empower citizens, as information communication technologies have lowered mobilization costs, allowing citizens to document problems and act collectively. New data also allow researchers access to different information and a wide variety of innovative techniques. On the other hand, state and nonstate actors may use Big Data to manipulate, monitor, repress, and police citizens. The availability of real-time data on social relations among people also allows states and corporations to monitor, influence, or sanction citizens without

their knowledge. The use of such data may offend widespread norms of privacy. How it is regulated is a serious question for the future of democracy.

Political knowledge is *itself* a consequential kind of information, and one that has its own experts. In Chapter 13, Stephanie Mudge examines the relationship between expertise and politics in the classical works of Machiavelli, Marx, Weber, Mannheim, and Merton. She then examines the increasing impact of network-relational thinking on the politics of expertise. She begins with social movement experts' credibility and then moves to the articulations of political parties in the state. These political parties are sites of expert judgment and knowledge production. Mudge examines the tension between expertise and democracy as "knowledge structures" that determine what is discovered, accepted, and communicated, and by whom. Expert interventions in the Bourdieusian theory of political fields may dispossess citizens (i.e., nonexperts). In the end, she argues for the need for a greater sociological study of "politics–expertise dynamics" that may lead to a "sociology of interventions."

Michael Rodríguez-Muñiz in Chapter 14 examines the politics of demographic knowledge. As the common root suggests, *demo*-cracy and *demo*-graphy have always been closely linked. He examines how political actors attempting to mobilize racial and ethnic groups make use of demographic claims. He describes projects of "demographic engineering" whereby groups are shaped by intentional and unintentional policies and politics. Population politics includes the construction of political rhetoric and knowledge about various demographic groups. The politics of racial threat is not a natural result of demographic change, but is instead actively constructed by knowledge entrepreneurs who provoke anxieties or raise hopes by projecting demographic futures. Such projections are political projects, rather than prophecies; the ethnoracial order of the future is nowhere written in stone, but will continue to evolve and change, as historical exigencies shape the growth of populations and the boundaries of groups. Rodríguez-Muñiz argues that the political uses of demographic knowledge are now a central topic for political sociology.

PART III: THE STATE AND ITS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

The state is a central concept in political sociology. It is also a contested concept. Many political sociologists today would rely on Max Weber's definition of the state as an organization that monopolizes the legitimate means of coercion. However, recent work also suggests the limits of Weber's conception of the state as a singular organization. Monopolizing legitimate violence may be one thing that states do, but it is only one: to know that an organization monopolizes legitimate means of coercion is not, ultimately, to know very much about its structure, its dynamics, or its effects on political and social life. Contemporary political sociology therefore is making progress by *disaggregating* states,

conceptualizing a state not as a single organization but as a conglomeration of relationships, organizations, or institutions. In place of “the state,” we may have executives, bureaucracies, legislatures, courts, the military, police, and even private voluntary associations and businesses to which officials have delegated some public or “state” functions (Morgan and Orloff 2017; Jessop 2016). Pierre Bourdieu famously distinguished between the “left hand” of the state – those agencies responsible for pensions, health care, and welfare – and “the right hand” of the state – those agencies responsible for maintaining order through budgetary discipline or violent repression. Political sociologists have radically pluralized this metaphor, referring to the state as a body with “many hands” (Morgan and Orloff 2017). This emphasis on the plurality or multiplicity of states runs through the recent work on the political sociology of states and their transformations reviewed in Part III.

In Chapter 15, Josh Pacewicz sees the political economy of the capitalist state as a comprehensive approach that treats polity, economy, and society as an interdependent whole. Recent work in this tradition has shed new light on the distinctively market-oriented variety of capitalism in the United States and on the financialization of the advanced capitalist economies. The best work in this area disaggregates the state and focuses on the politics of scale at the subnational level. Nevertheless, Pacewicz concludes that these theoretical interventions may have run their course. It is time to reconstruct the theoretical bridge between local, disaggregated state institutions and the worldwide, system-level transformations that preoccupied the classical thinkers of political economy. Pacewicz argues for a focus on how public policy structures politics, and on the “middle state” that stands between national legislation and local implementation. This is the road to the new political economy.

In Chapter 16, Elisabeth Clemens and Wan-Zi Lu argue that a state is best theorized as sets of interrelated institutions, each with its own unique effects on the political process. This internal plurality is a source of dynamism in the structure and organization of states. Clemens and Lu offer vivid examples from the recent sociology of empires, the political sociology of markets, and the sociology of developmental states, to illustrate how different institutions within the state can sometimes complement or counteract each other. Their conception of states as plural also opens up the understanding of *de*-institutionalization. States may include competing institutional orders or logics that may undermine one another. Actors who institutionalize social practices in the state may aim to remove those practices from the political realm altogether. However, the creation of multiple institutions within the state sometimes creates friction and opens up new zones of contention.

With Richard Lachmann, in Chapter 17, we turn our attention to a particular kind of state: the nation-state as it took shape in Western Europe after the fifteenth century. Lachmann argues that the consolidation of nation-states was an unintended consequence of competition among agrarian elites. Much as

Julian Go did in Chapter 5, Lachmann also emphasizes the simultaneity of nation-state formation with projects of imperial conquest outside of the putatively national territory. The exigencies of war and conquest created the conditions for mass citizenship, and then for projects of cultural and linguistic standardization that ultimately lent plausibility to the idea of a well-bounded nation and a national culture. Lachmann notes the interdependence of cultural, economic, military, and ideological power. The dynamic relationships among these forms of power, he argues, are a central theoretical topic for future scholars of nation-state formation.

Isaac William Martin's Chapter 18 inquires into the effects of fiscal relations *within* nation-states. This chapter presents a brief for fiscal sociology, a research program that conceptualizes states as sets of dynamic fiscal relationships. Martin points out three contributions of fiscal sociology to political sociology. The first contribution is the theory that taxation contributes to democratization. The second contribution is an explanation of the persistent relationship between fiscal austerity and protest in democratic states. The third is an insight into the effects of fiscal relations on political parties: here, converging with Pacewicz's Chapter 15, Martin argues that an important future direction for political sociology is the inquiry into how policies can make and remake political alignments. Fiscal sociology is described in this chapter as a theoretical program, but one that does not purport to be a comprehensive *Weltanschauung*, so much as a network of middle-range propositions with logical and empirical support.

In Chapter 19, Joachim Savelsberg and Amber Joy Powell turn our attention from fiscal to carceral relations within the modern nation-state. They define a carceral state as one that confines an exceptionally large share of its citizens. They focus their review on theories that might account for the emergence and persistence of a carceral state in the US. Savelsberg and Powell draw attention to crime rates, social conflicts, and the actions of political elites. They place special emphasis on the role played by institutional structures that mediate the production and circulation of knowledge about crime. The structure of contemporary knowledge markets in the United States – defined broadly to include mass media, polling firms, and both academic and nonacademic research organizations – has amplified perceptions of crime and demands for punitive solutions. They also suggest that future research should focus on policy feedbacks. A policy of large-scale incarceration can become entrenched by incapacitating or disenfranchising precisely those citizens who would be most skeptical of the policy – and by creating another class of citizens who have vested economic interests in carceral employment.

Jessica Kim and Kathleen Fallon, in Chapter 20, address what is arguably *the* classic question of political sociology: What are the social bases or origins of democratic politics? They argue that there is considerable organizational heterogeneity *within* any given state, even in democracies and dictatorships. States are multifaceted organizations, and a single state can become more

democratic in some areas, while simultaneously becoming more authoritarian in others. Moreover, they find that “democracy” itself is a moving target: many states considered democratic in the 1960s had not yet enfranchised all or even most of their adult citizens. Thus, more rewards can be reaped by shifting the focus from democracy to *democratization* including expanding access to rights of citizenship. This shift to democratization (as a process unfolding over time) also draws our attention to transnational influences ranging from geopolitical competition and war to the relatively peaceful diffusion of practices and ideas. Kim and Fallon argue that future work on democratization should focus on institutional designs for democracy and on groups that are still excluded.

Colin Beck, in Chapter 21, reviews the political sociology of revolutions, defined as situations in which two or more blocs make effective claims to be the legitimate state, and advance competing ideological visions of the social order. Beck argues that political sociologists have so far accumulated little valid knowledge of any generality about the causal dynamics of revolutions. He nevertheless identifies several promising future directions. One is a focus on transnational processes: although revolutions involve claims to be or control states, revolutionary processes are not well bounded by states. Nation-states should not be treated in revolution studies as independent observational units. Another future direction is a focus on contingency within the revolutionary episode. Those who experience revolutions often describe them as moments of unusual indeterminacy. Beck argues that more scholars should take seriously the ideas that a revolutionary situation has its own dynamics, and that small events in the course of an unfolding revolution may have large consequences.

PART IV: CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ROOTS AND PROCESSES OF POLITICAL ACTION

Previously, many areas of civil society such as citizenship and political parties were little studied in political sociology. However, research on the various components of civil society is undergoing a renaissance. Citizenship and legality have gone from a relatively nonsalient theory to a matter of life or death for many immigrants, and political parties are now seen as a shaper rather than a reflection of citizen opinions and public policies. Social movements now operate in framed arenas of contention, and political machines control some regions and countries. Populism, once thought to be confined to Latin America, is now at the forefront of the politics of Donald Trump in the United States, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and in other countries, much to the distress of established elites and liberal democrats. In addition, nationalism plays a major role in such struggles, and the impact of public opinion on policy is increasingly called into question. Overall, civil society ends up being a rather complex field of power.

Thomas Janoski and Sara Compion in Chapter 22, “The Challenges of Citizenship in Civil Society,” document four overarching trends of citizenship. The first of these is the increasing tendency on the part of social movements to

frame their struggles in terms of citizenship. Second, this tendency has led scholars to give short shrift to established theoretical frameworks of citizenship, namely, the liberal, social democratic, and civic communitarian. Next, Janoski and Compion observe mounting interest in how asylum and undocumented immigration is transforming the ways in which we think about citizenship. So-called Western states have shifted their attention from producing citizens to preventing and punishing those who arrive and seek citizenship. Deportation, apprehension, and stigmatizing discourse all may produce a semi-permanent status of “noncitizenship.” Finally, as neoliberal globalization proceeds, there is a new tendency to examine global citizenship regimes with some strongly backed by institutions and others without such support and consequently being quite fragile.

In Chapter 23, James Jasper argues that the canonical structural approach to social movements placed very little stock in notions that movement actors and their grievances were the prime mover of mass mobilization. Instead, Mayer Zald, Doug McAdam, and others held that resources and political opportunities structured social movement emergence and success. Though Robert Benford and David Snow’s concept of framing was a move away from structuralism, Jasper points out that movement participants do not internalize movement messages in coherent frames or ideologies, but rather in discrete feelings and meanings. Accordingly, he argues, the most recent shift in social movement theory has been to specify how culture and emotion motivate participation and sacrifice. In addition, we are paying more attention to the fluid interaction of movements with other “players” like political parties. This becomes even more interesting in light of populist organizations like the Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, which are antiparty movements and parties at the same time.

After a half-century hiatus, political sociologists have once again taken up parties as a central object of inquiry. Johnnie Lotesta and Cedric de Leon’s Chapter 24 explores the efflorescence of this body of work through the lens of an important theoretical framework in the field, “political articulation.” In contrast to the “cleavage” approach, which held that differences of class, race, and urban/rural residence conditioned political behavior, advocates of political articulation insist that the salience of these putative differences is largely the result of partisan struggle. Political parties naturalize cleavages in a bid to “articulate” otherwise disparate groups into would-be hegemonic coalitions. Analytical gaps have emerged, however, as more sociologists attempt to use the articulation framework. For example, some political sociologists emphasize the role of experts in articulating cleavages, while others are more interested in the social structural conditions that enable or constrain articulation.

Manali Desai and Rashmi Singh’s analysis in Chapter 25 of “Machine Politics and Clientelism” also returns to a classic topic in political sociology. In 1963, Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson argued that political party systems in American cities were patronage machines rather than ideological coalitions

because of what Banfield and Wilson called the “private-regarding ethos” of immigrant workers. Although Banfield and Wilson’s account is now discredited, the central puzzle of machine politics remains. Desai and Singh describe two subsequent paradigmatic shifts in the study of patronage politics. The first of these is the sequential institutional approach, which traces the origins of machine politics to the timing of large-scale social transformations such as bureaucratization, urbanization, and working-class formation. The second is the advent of what the authors call an “anthropological” impulse to theorize the moral economy of political exchange in the Global South.

In Chapter 26, on volunteering and civic associations, and political participation, Sara Compion and Thomas Janoski show the varied effects of volunteering in promoting or hindering democratic politics. Volunteering and civic associations can be effectively controlled by the state, but they can also influence the state in effective ways. Compion and Janoski look at the optimistic Tocquevillian view of volunteering, in contrast with evidence that volunteering often has little impact on politics for good or ill. They then examine how corporations and the state can control volunteering within democracies. Transnational nongovernmental organizations that promote volunteering also sometimes have deleterious effects on poorer countries by imposing a so-called Western viewpoint that does not fit some local cultures. The second part of the chapter examines the presence of democratic volunteering in seven different forums from face-to-face assemblies to intra-party democracy. In the third part of the chapter, they provide a process model of how volunteering and civic associations may become important in the politics of democratic government.

In Chapter 27, Mario Giugni and Jasmine Lorenzini analyze the roles that social movements play in the renewed study of party politics. Giugni and Lorenzini ask a deceptively simple yet bedeviling question, namely, how do citizens respond to economic crises like the Great Recession? One answer is that citizens retreat from the public sphere, but the opposite might occur in that they become more politicized. Giugni and Lorenzini argue that research supports the latter conclusion, but they find that political sociologists tend to address these questions in two isolated literatures. Accordingly, Giugni and Lorenzini urge a synthesis of movement- and electoral-centered research anchored in what they see as a “crisis of representation” that takes hold amidst economic crisis. They argue for a focus on the rise of new political actors that are neither fully movements nor fully parties, such as new right-wing populist parties in Europe and “left of the left” party movements such as the Indignados in Spain. They focus, too, on the role of leadership as this intersects with new hybrid political forms.

Paul Burstein, in Chapter 28, reviews recent scholarship on the influence of public opinion on policy. He argues that some scholars take the relative influence of public opinion on democratic governance for granted, and seek to measure the extent to which the former does or does not affect the latter. Burstein suggests that the entire enterprise may be cast into doubt by the fact

that there is no public opinion or interest group advocacy on most issues. Burstein argues that knowledge about the effects of public opinion on policy is in its infancy, because most studies select on the dependent variable – by identifying policies that are sufficiently prominent to attract the attention of public opinion polling organizations. He proposes two remedies. One is research aimed at generalizability by devoting careful attention to sampling of political issues. The second is to use case studies to draw more modest conclusions about *how* public opinion and advocacy may succeed or fail to have an impact on policy, and when they operate in each direction.

Liah Greenfeld and Zeying Wu's Chapter 29 reframes ethnic nationalism and populism as struggles for dignity. Neither modernist theories, which regard nationalism as a creation of the early modern era, nor primordialist theories, which treat nationalism as an expression of premodern group identities, give us adequate theoretical purchase on the myriad new nationalisms emerging across the globe today. They identify the birthplace of nationalism as sixteenth-century England, and they treat this case as the ideal type in order to illuminate causes of nationalist politics more generally. What binds the genesis of nationalism to its contemporary descendants, they argue, is a struggle for what they call "dignity capital." Perceived differences in dignity between nations may encourage people to value national sovereignty, and may generate resentment among other nations. Working through these ideas with case studies from Europe and the United States, they then analyze how nationalism has spread to other regions, with a particular focus on China.

PART V: ESTABLISHED AND NEW STATE POLICIES AND INNOVATIONS

As in other areas of political sociology, research on policies in the twenty-first century reflects the tensions created by inequalities of class, gender, race, and nationality. Neoliberalism has wreaked havoc on welfare state policies and government spending. However, some policies have expanded in this period such as same-sex marriage, though abortion battles still rage. Immigration policy, once an issue of only moderate attention, is now front and center as countries try to keep asylum seekers and others out. On the other hand, military expenditures have increased, and agencies designed to protect the homeland from terrorism have gained in personnel and finances. The chapters in this section reflect how interconnected inequality and policies are, as state and global policies may attempt to mediate while also reinforcing and reinscribing inequalities. These inequalities also affect fiscal and monetary policy, welfare state and social policies, migration policy, human rights policy, and cosmopolitanism, reaching further into a world with continuing wars in the Middle East and terroristic threats in the West.

John Campbell in Chapter 30 considers how fiscal and monetary policy have developed over the last century, with an aim of facilitating economic growth, innovation, and employment through adjustments to spending, taxation, and the money supply. While the Keynesian approach to regulating the economy was popular in the mid-twentieth century, neoliberal approaches became predominant by its end. Yet neoliberal strategies generally did not lead to rapid economic growth, and Campbell shows how policies of the last few decades have tended to increase inequality. They also contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. While the crisis led to a brief return to Keynesian policies in some quarters of the globe, neoliberal austerity policies remain ascendant in many countries, leading to high levels of inequality – and increasing power for nationalist movements, as Greenfeld and Zeying noted in Chapter 29.

In Chapter 31, Stephanie Moller and Tengteng Cai focus on how political sociologists have shifted their attention from explaining the development of the welfare state to understanding its differential impacts. They begin by analyzing the role of citizenship in modern welfare states: consistent with Hearn and Hobson in Chapter 6, they argue that recent scholarship emphasizes the intersections of citizenship with factors such as gender, class, race, nationality, and family status. Even among wealthy countries, they identify remarkable cross-national variation in income inequality after considering welfare state policies. Moller and Cai point out that welfare states typically offer less support for less-valued groups, such as immigrants or families headed by single mothers. They also point to welfare state policies in Latin America, East Asia, and other regions as new sources of understandings of how states use social policies. Moller and Cai argue that welfare states cannot be understood as offering social citizenship to their members, instead offering differentiated citizenship in an unequal global order.

In Chapter 32 on sexuality, gender, and social policy, Joya Misra and Mary Bernstein argue that ideas about gender, gender identity, and sexuality permeate and structure political institutions and policies. These ideas are shaped by existing political institutions, social movements (on both the right and left), cultural and religious ideologies, historical legacies, and transnational political and economic forces. Misra and Bernstein consider three sets of policies: those concerning relationship recognition and reproduction, employment, and social welfare. In each of the three domains, policy has complex, sometimes contradictory effects. Rather than simply promoting equality, policies may reinforce existing inequalities by race, class, nationality, and colonial legacy (among others), as well as gender, sexuality, and gender identity. While twenty-first-century states are beginning to respond to the demands of women's and LGBTQ movements, structural inequalities and cultural misrecognition remain powerful.

Irene Bloemraad and Rebecca Hamlin consider migration policies in Chapter 33. They begin by considering policies that affect entry into a state's territory as a migrant or refugee, addressing the enormous challenges that refugees and

migrants face in the twenty-first century due to war, economic collapse, and climate change. As they note, while at one time and place a person may be conceptualized as a refugee deserving of asylum, at another time, the same person may be viewed as an undocumented “illegal” migrant. Bloemraad and Hamlin next explore policies that influence settlement, including integration and citizenship policies. Even as some countries make entry more open to migrants, they have created additional controls over migrants, reflecting racist and nationalist ideas about who deserves social citizenship. Echoing others in the volume, Bloemraad and Hamlin emphasize the multiplicity of legal statuses that migrants might hold and the complexity of claims for social rights and citizenship in the twenty-first century.

Mark Frezzo takes on the question of cosmopolitanism in Chapter 34. He considers how globalization may not only reflect inequality, but also promote world citizenship, global governance, and human rights. This approach focuses on creating peaceful relations between countries and eliminating structural inequalities. Seeing cosmopolitanism as an epistemic community, Frezzo lays out the organization of global justice movements, including how they map onto human rights. The rise of both far right nationalist movements and religious extremism has cut against cosmopolitan movements, but Frezzo argues that cosmopolitanism balances globally binding norms with the recognition of local cultures.

In Chapter 35, Gregory Hooks examines the changing relationship between states and war. He argues that globalization and technological change have resulted in a condition of “liquid modernity” that fundamentally transforms the relationships between states and their societies. States in the twentieth century could pretend to be walled gardens, in which rulers cultivated well-bounded economies and societies; states in the twenty-first century must struggle to manage cross-border flows of people, resources, and ideas. This condition has important consequences for the conduct of war and for its effects on social life. New technologies allow states of the Global North to conduct war at a distance – enabling them to transfer the risks of their conflicts to troops and populations from the Global South. War no longer has the effect of strengthening state institutions. Nor must states any longer grant rights of citizenship in exchange for military service. Instead of enriching citizenship, wars of our time create large displaced populations stripped of the rights of citizens.

PART VI: GLOBALIZATION AND NEW AND BIGGER SOURCES OF POWER AND RESISTANCE

The world has been “globalized” for a long time, as empires have encountered each other for two millennia from Rome to the British Empire, and subject countries submit to control. Globalization became a buzzword in the late twentieth century as transportation costs decreased, information technologies made global networks easier to maintain, the reach and power of certain nation-

states intensified, and new competitors arose to join the exclusive club of quasi-empires. Amidst international political and economic turmoil, the United States remains powerful, but its economic might is notably less dominant. As American economic growth has slowed, China's economy has risen to the second largest in the world, and a tri-polar world of the United States, China and East Asia, and the European Union seems possible. The Communist bloc has crumbled since 1989, but Russia is once again exerting its influence internationally, most famously by destabilizing elections in liberal democratic states. Meanwhile, the Middle East has become home to new forms of political Islam, including Al-Qaeda and ISIS that have launched attacks around the world. Fears of terrorism in turn have provided the pretext for new and intensive security regimes. The United States has been the vanguard of providing military support to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Numerous actors have emerged to challenge the neoliberal policies promulgated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank: social democratic parties, particularly in Latin America, offer progressive alternatives ranging from left populism (e.g., Venezuela) to socialism based on indigenous struggles (e.g., Bolivia). The chapters in this section all address these and other global challenges.

In Chapter 36, Şakin Erin and Christopher Chase-Dunn present an overview of world-systems theory that posits a hierarchical relationship between core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral states in the capitalist world economy, which is based on legacies of colonial exploitation. In its most recent incarnation, the Keynesian developmental project has been replaced by a neoliberal global governance project resulting in mounting inequality within countries. Trade globalization has increased from 12 percent in 1960 to 30 percent of world GDP in 2005. There is a New Global Right and Left, and political sociology, Erin and Chase-Dunn argue, must comprehend the long-term transition from territorial empire to trade-controlled empire. World-systems theory asks analysts to follow the money in terms of trade and investment, in order to identify the advantage that powerful core countries can exercise over the periphery. World-systems analysis is relational: Erin and Chase-Dunn stress the importance of network analysis, and the difference between structural and regular equivalence in comparing nations' relative position in the world-system.

In Chapter 37 on trade globalization, Michael Dreiling examines the pressure of business in addition to conservative politicians in promoting trade, especially under a regime of financialization. He theorizes the linkages between institutional politics and the new economic sociology with its emphasis on financialization, stock markets, and trade. Dreiling describes trade liberalization with an emphasis on corporate political action and neoliberalism as an "upper-class" or elite project, implemented by the state and capitalists. Using the United States as an example, he focuses on forces that liberalized international markets and then built transnational trade institutions. He especially targets the role of big business from pursuing tariffs before the Trade Act of 1933, and their latter efforts in pushing for free markets

that allow their corporate powers to be exerted in the international marketplace. This began after the Second World War with GATT under President Kennedy and then a series of free trade deals under a number of presidents that leads to more and more global economic domination – the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, among many others.

Moon-Kie Jung and Yaejoon Kwon in Chapter 38 draw attention to another legacy of colonialism – the enduring racial hierarchy associated with white settler colonialism. Their intervention turns on Michael Omi and Howard Winant's (1994) breakthrough concepts of a racialization project and a racial state. The racial state insulates itself against challengers by constantly absorbing new and unstable hegemonic racial orders. Jung and Kwon build on Omi and Winant by advancing the concept of the "empire-state." The latter contains a hierarchically differentiated racial state. Thus, for example, the United States dominates Blacks, Asians, Latinos, and Native Americans, but it does so in different ways for each group: for instance, advancing a policy of assimilation for Native Americans that dispossesses indigenous people of land, even as it embraces a regime of social death, whether by slavery or mass incarceration, for many Black people.

In Chapter 39, Carlos de la Torre examines how populism has developed in the United States and Europe. De la Torre reviews political, ideational, and discursive theories of populism, and presents a synthetic view of populism as a strategy for polarizing society. Although populist ruptures put populist leaders in power, the latter cannot fulfill their claims to put the people in charge; as a result, nominally populist regimes typically reconfigure themselves into authoritarian regimes. De la Torre investigates alternative ideologies and organizations, especially Bolivarian Circles, Communal Councils, and Urban Land and Water Committees. However, these participatory forms of governance, he says, lack autonomy from the populist leader. While in power, populists confront competing political institutions from the judiciary to the media. Crises of national security promote populism. In effect, populism is an antiglobalization movement, but, at best, it is a refuge for the abandoned citizens, and ultimately it is a dead end.

In the last chapter, Peter Evans looks at transnational social movements that are trying to change politics and the economy. He sets out to explain the evolution of transnational social movements, including labor, environmental, feminist, and human rights movements that emerged in the last part of the twentieth century. Evans argues that particular conditions allowed these movements to flourish, including the increased globalization of the economy and the spread of new communication technologies – but also including, ironically, the spread of neoliberal ideology, which, despite its failures, created a discursive opening for assertions of universal principles that transcended national sovereignty. Although the growth of these movements has slowed, and some optimistic predictions about how they would transform the global order have gone unfulfilled, they have achieved some important

changes. Evans argues that the increasing interconnectedness of these movements suggests an important source of resilience. They may remain durable even as illiberal regimes seek to undermine them.

CONCLUSION

Political sociology encounters a different world today than the turn of the century captured in the first *Handbook of Political Sociology* in 2005. Globalization is now contested, and democracy is no longer taken for granted as a goal or an analytical object. Illiberal regimes have taken root in formerly democratic states. Alternative political projects such as political Islam, ethnic nationalism, and social democracy compete with neoliberalism for hegemony. Terrorism and the Internet are weapons that establish diverse battlegrounds. Both conventional measures of democracy and measures of civic engagement such as the frequency of volunteering reported by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics have gone down since 2012. At the beginning of this Introduction, we noted that observers are posing the question of whether the United States is in decline; but scholars have been claiming that the United States has been in decline since the 1950s. Rather than repeat these tropes of “declinism,” we see the future as posing many new and often unpredictable changes. We believe that the flexibility and willingness of political sociology to be open to new phenomena, theories, and methods will enable this field to deal with these changes in many ways.⁷

Political sociology has seven new directions to encounter these new challenges: (1) inequality, intersectionality, and citizenship; (2) new tools of articulation and various fields of power; (3) an emphasis on the role of the media, knowledge, and classification; (4) a redefining of the importance of race and postcoloniality; (5) a reinvigorated approach to gender and sexuality; (6) the processes of policy feedback and misrecognition in making citizen identities; and (7) a revised theory of social interaction and social psychology.

First, the “new gilded age” of massive inequality and threatened citizenship has prompted political sociology toward the increased study of the critically important relationships between politics and inequality. While inequality has always been important to political sociology, its massive increase since the mid-twentieth century has been astounding (Kenworthy and Smeeding 2013; Milanovic 2009). So much so that Thomas Piketty’s (2014) complex economic book – *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* – attacking inequality

⁷ Fettweis indicates that “Declinism first appeared in the late 1950s and has repeatedly re-emerged with metronomic regularity since” (2018: 166). The brief unipolar world that appeared after the fall of communism is now a multipolar world with the United States, a semi-united Europe, and China leading East Asia as a new world power dynamic. Despite dystopian forecasts for the West, moderate growth continues in the United States, and China’s high growth rates may significantly drop with rising wages and when the Chinese economy is no longer boosted by Western technology transfers.

and recommending a “global tax on wealth” reached the *New York Times* Best Sellers list. While elites and most politicians have ignored his recommendations, the public has taken notice of the rank unfairness of world incomes and wealth. Inequality rates in the United States are at a record level, but much less noticed are the enormous levels of inequality in China and India, countries that have had major economic growth and somewhat rising incomes. This increase in inequality has produced a twofold result of increasing polarization both between and within countries combined with the conspicuous consumption of the superrich and the subsequent political ruptures. This increase has largely been associated with neoliberal policies to promote business and decrease regulation, and at the same time to cut welfare states and create greater vulnerability around the globe.

While T. H. Marshall’s (1950) original framing of political, civil, and social citizenship has been criticized for not recognizing how “social citizenship” only accrued to certain people (e.g., white working-class men), the concept of citizenship becomes even more powerful as it claims to balance the excesses of the market with social citizenship that will benefit the less well off. In an era in which inequality is increasing by leaps and bounds, citizenship claims appear increasingly tenuous for many members of society and nearly impossible with attacks on so-called noncitizens. While immigrants and refugees face challenges, other groups, such as felons in the United States, can also find themselves without political citizenship rights. People may be increasingly denied or stripped of citizenship and left stateless. Many others, including Afro-diasporic descendants, transgender people, the disabled, and the poor can find themselves shut out of social citizenship in some ways even while they are included in others. As it ripples through race, class, gender, sexuality, and nationality the relationship between massive economic inequality and the institution of citizenship will remain a central problem for political sociological studies of countries and the globe.

Second, political sociologists also confront this world of increasing inequality with new conceptual and theoretical tools. The analytical core of political sociology is no longer the relationship between state and social classes, conceived as separate and coherent analytical objects. In place of *the* state, political sociologists today conceptualize states as differentiated and sometimes incoherent sets of institutions and relationships. Instead of assuming that the roots of politics lie in social cleavages of class, race, and gender, political sociologists today attend to the ways in which parties, social movements, and public policy themselves divide and redivide society. For example, a number of right-wing parties like the BJP in India, the AKP in Turkey, and ethnic nationalist parties in the United States and Europe forge hegemonic blocs by naturalizing religious and “native-born” peoples as victimized majorities. Older divisions between materialist and culturalist approaches no longer seem compelling as both approaches have become useful. Many political sociologists today are focusing on Pierre Bourdieu’s fields of political power that differ across the nation-state and the globe, and

often extend through economic value chains that link societies into unequal social networks of resources, discourses, and coercive mechanisms. Relational and reflexive approaches to social action have begun to supplant an older approach that assumed political interests and values as givens (Janoski 2017). These are the new and transformed directions for a vibrant but in many ways diverse future for political sociology.

Third, the complex area of media, data, and knowledge is impacted by classification, whether done by the state or private organizations in society. Big data has complicated and to some degree diffused this process, but it is brought together again by experts in society who shape, frame, and articulate these bare data. The salience of Russian hacking into the elections of many countries, and the posting of Hilary Clinton's campaign emails on the web, are events we have not contemplated before. Cyberwarfare is in the offing, perhaps with power grids as the next targets. Then we have the slogan of "fake news," attacks on the media, and polarization of pundits in the public sphere.

The media, data, and knowledge have rarely been fully integrated into political sociology, but they are now so intertwined and interactive with everyday life that they can no longer be mere sideline replacements to be called into analyses of politics when needed. Further, the shaping of knowledge by state actions, especially in the census, guides and even imprints the premises of action. Sociologists have previously neglected this area of study, but now scholars have made this central to the processes of politics (Emigh, Riley, and Ahmed 2015, Emigh and Riley 2016; Loveman 2014). Meanwhile, extreme polarization and charges of fake news have clouded over elite expertise, social networks, and many websites. Simultaneously, what private and state organizations know about citizens has exploded with big data. The media themselves have become a political battleground. Nevertheless, what is needed is more research on how political action committees, political parties, social movements, and politicians use these multiplying sites of communication.

Fourth, within sociology's sharpening focus on inequality is a greater engagement with the sociology of race and postcoloniality. Although this engagement has begun, it remains unclear whether and how political sociology may change as a result. The intersection of institutional politics and race in the areas of immigration, civil rights, criminalization, education, and health is self-evident, but in practice there is little overlap among the communities of scholars engaged in each area of inquiry.

This is in part a matter of social distance among white and nonwhite scholars, as well as scholars located in the Global North and Global South, but it is also about the absence of a conceptual infrastructure that might facilitate greater engagement. Key chapters in this volume attempt to sketch out the ways in which sociologists of race and political sociologists could help each other. For example, because the general drift of power theory has been away from domination and toward hegemony, it is somewhat ill-equipped to explain the mounting violence and aggression that characterizes so much of

contemporary race relations the world over. De Leon and Clarno point to scholars of race, most famously Du Bois, who have long theorized liberal democracy as coercive and exclusionary. Likewise, whereas Omi and Winant (1994) understand the contemporary racialized state to function under conditions of “racial democracy” as opposed to the racial domination of segregation and apartheid, Jung and Kwon insist that the white settler colonial state continues to violently rearrange the lives of racialized others. Understanding the politics of migration and citizenship also requires considering race and colonialism.

Conceptualization of postcoloniality has the potential to reshape political sociology away from frameworks that privilege Eurocentric models of politics. A world-systems approach has long theorized how broader historical and global views provide new insights into the workings of political economy. More hopeful models of cosmopolitanism also involve a recognition of the influence of colonialism. In addition, scholarship recognizes the critical role colonialism has played in shaping gender and politics. Our hope is that this handbook generates lively conversation at the intersection of race and politics for years to come.

Fifth, feminist scholarship has reworked understandings of the state and politics in substantial ways. Scholars working from lenses focused on gender and sexuality have pointed to how the state is embedded in families and other institutions, calling into question the assumed boundaries between “public” and “private.” By showing the interconnections between families, markets, and states, these scholars have also emphasized the complexity of the state, and its many contradictions (Haney 1996; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Orloff 1993).

A key frontier in analyzing politics that comes out of feminist scholarship is the development of intersectional frameworks, which identify how class, gender, sexuality, gender identity, race, ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship, as well as many other statuses, intersect to impact both political engagement and how the state recognizes and values (or devalues) its members. Legal and political structures work to shape opportunities as well as place limits on groups that differ by these statuses. Intersectionality also identifies the relationship between advantaged and disadvantaged groups. For example, the Social Security Act created opportunities for many groups, but disadvantaged farm workers and domestic workers – many of whom were Black or Latinx women (Gordon 1994; Mink 1996). Intersectional models require political sociologists to consider how politics and policies have uneven impacts, drawing our attention to how varied citizenship is in the twenty-first century.

Scholarship on sexuality has also provided examples of how states can criminalize, persecute, regulate, and provide opportunities to people based on their sexuality. In many countries, LGBTQ people have fewer rights, and in some countries their status may be criminalized. Even when governments may support LGBTQ people, for example, in legalizing same-sex marriage, the state

intrudes in ways that tend to discipline LGBTQ subjects, making them conform to “normalizing” approaches to organizing families. Such research continues to draw attention to the perils as well as protections the state affords.

A sixth major change in political sociology has been a focus on the cognitive effects of public policy. Early political sociologists treated public policies mainly as outcomes to be explained. Subsequent work by Theda Skocpol (1993) and Paul Pierson (1993) put policy feedback effects on the agenda for political sociology. Policies, which some citizens may not have previously wanted or cared about, became powerful enough in their effects to change citizen attitudes and values. This “policy feedback” approach, with roots in the classic work of E. E. Schattschneider (1935), became much more important in recent years (Campbell 2002). One example of policy feedback is the move from fixed pensions to 401(k) and 403(b) portable investment funds that made union-oriented workers into stock market investing fund managers. This change converted many workers into capitalists watching stock markets with avid interest. Similarly, citizens who may have been strong conservatives, as they age into senior status suddenly become advocates for expanded social security and Medicare programs (helped no doubt by the American Association for Retired Persons). As these examples suggest, much work on policy feedback has emphasized the role of vested interests.

Some of the most promising recent work, however, has turned toward the emotional and interpretive effects of public policies – as well as toward ideational processes that can impede policy feedbacks, a point that may be related to Bourdieu’s concept of “misrecognition” (Bourdieu 2014; Clemens 2006). Although some scholarship suggests, for example, that certain ways of raising taxes or delivering benefits may be more salient, other scholars find these processes “invisible” or “submerged” (Mayrl and Quinn 2016, 2017; Mettler 2011; Quinn and Mayrl 2018; Wilensky 2002). Much more remains to be learned about the conditions under which benefits become salient, and the conditions under which even highly salient benefits are sufficient to change public attitudes. The oft-quoted statement of a citizen at a 2009 congressional town hall meeting on the Affordable Care Act – “keep your government hands off my Medicare” – illustrates that even highly beneficial public policies may not change feelings about government in general. Much promising research can be made on the conditions under which public policy affects public opinion and strongly felt political identities.

Finally, the seventh promising future direction is the development of the social psychology of political action. Levi Martin and Judd point to the death of the GOFAT model – Good Old Fashioned Action Theory or the “Desires/Beliefs/Opportunities Model” – arguing that current theories do not think a person’s attitudes are caused simply by their membership in particular categories (class, occupation, race, gender, etc.). Political sociology emerged in dialogue with political psychology, as in the social networks approach of Lazarsfeld. This dialogue is now in a period of revival. Baldassarri’s (2012) use

of cognitive psychology in political science and behavioral economics is a promising development. Political scientists have been very active in this area (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Druckman, Levendusky, and McLain 2017; Levendusky, Druckman, and McLain 2016; Zuckerman 2005). However, the cognitive approach is more oriented toward how positive heuristics are constructed, especially cognitive shortcuts rather than the more common negative approach of cognitive errors. Further, this approach exists within a more sociological one of social networks and opinion leaders, rather than attitudes or cleavages determining your opinions. A greater attention to the social psychology of politics might help to make sense of the politics of *ressentiment* and backlash that seems salient today (Grey and Janoski 2017). It might also shed light on the politics of redistribution on a global scale. Under what conditions are elites willing to share resources with the middle classes and poor, and under what conditions is the Global North willing to share resources with the Global South? Structural analyses are useful here, but an examination of the social psychology of elite behavior in context might complement our macro-level theories of political sociology.

To meet these analytical challenges – and others that we cannot yet anticipate – political sociologists will no doubt have to continue remaking their theories. Since the 1950s, political sociology has met the challenge of a changing world by continually broadening its scope. From early studies of electoral behavior, to studies of democratic regimes, and then to studies of transnational waves of democratization, the analytical movement has been one of *expansion*. This means the recognition of more societies, more diverse social forms, and more processes as belonging to the domain of political sociology. As a result, political sociologists have shown a salutary willingness to question their central theoretical concepts, and to draw on the best ideas available without policing the borders of the discipline. Politics around the world in the coming decades will no doubt bring events at least as surprising as those that have occurred since the first edition of this handbook.

The challenge for political sociologists will be to meet new events and changing structures with theories and methods adequate to explaining them. The task of editing this *New Handbook of Political Sociology* has made us optimistic that political sociology will meet these challenges in the future with the theoretical and substantive tools necessary to explain emerging political interactions, reformulating structures, and often surprising outcomes.

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